David J. Woodcock v. John Crandall : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1993
David J. Woodcock v. John Crandall : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert M. Anderson; Anderson and Watkins; Attorneys for Appellee.
Steven C. Tycksen; Day and Barney; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Woodcock v. Crandall, No. 930288 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5172
H CCy^T O? APPEALS 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 





IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 





REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
CASE NO. mm 
PRIORITY 15 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Summit County, State of Utah 
The Honorable Frank G. Noel 
Steven C. Tycksen (#3300) 
Day & Barney 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
(801) 262-6800 
Robert M. Anderson 
Anderson & Watkins 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
10 E. South Temple, #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
(801) 530-7480 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
AUG 1 3 1993 
0U/#M 
J* Mary T. Noonan 
Y Clerk of the Court 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID J. WOODCOCK, : 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, : REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
vs. 
JOHN CRANDALL, : CASE NO. 92-0570 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT. : PRIORITY 15 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Summit County, State of Utah 
The Honorable Frank G. Noel 
Steven C. Tycksen (#3300) 
Day & Barney 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
(801) 262-6800 
Robert M. Anderson 
Anderson & Watkins 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
10 E. South Temple, #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
(801) 530-7480 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES i 
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES ii-xvi 
ARGUMENT 1-11 
A. Crandall/s Brief Complies with Rule 24 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure because it concisely lays out the 
issues for review, the standards applicable to each issue and 
the relief sought on appeal 1 
B. Woodcock's submission of the judgment to the court for 
signing prior to presenting the judgment to Crandall violated 
Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
3 
C. Woodcock violated Rule 4-506 by failing to wait twenty 
days after serving a Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel 
before any additional proceedings were initiated against 
Crandall 5 
D. The trial court erred in granting Summary Judgment because 
there are genuine issues of material fact which preclude the 
granting of Summary Judgment 7 
CONCLUSION 11 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
N e l s o n v . J a c o b s e n . 699 P . 2 d 1207 ( U t a h 
1983) 6 
P r a t t v . M i t c h e l l Hollow I r r . C o . . 813 P . 2 d 1169 
(Utah 1991) 10 
State v. Yates. 834 P.3d 599 (Ut. App. 1992) 2 
STATUTES 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 78-36-10 4,5 
RULES 
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 1,2 
Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial Administration 9 
Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration 3, 4, 5, 11 
Rule 4-506, Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration 5, 7, 11 
1 
TABLE OF RULES AND STATUTES CITED 
§7 8-36-10 Judgment for restitution, damages and rent-Immediate 
enforcement- Treble damages 
(1) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or upon 
default. A judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff shall 
include an order for the restitution of the premises. If the 
proceeding is for unlawful detainer after neglect or failure to 
perform any condition or covenant of the lease or agreement under 
which the property is held, or after default in the payment of 
rent, the judgment shall also declare the forfeiture of the lease 
or agreement. 
(2) The jury or court, if the proceeding is tried without a 
jury or upon the defendant's default, shall also assess the damages 
resulting to the plaintiff from any of the following: 
(a) forcible entry; 
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer; 
(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's tenancy, 
if waste is alleged in the complaint and proved at trial; 
and 
(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged unlawful 
detainer is after default in the payment of rent. 
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for 
the rent, for three times the amount of the damages assessed under 
Section 2(a) through 2(c), and for reasonable attorney's fees, if 
they are provided for in the lease or agreement. 
(4) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after default 
in the payment of the rent, execution upon the judgment shall be 
issued immediately after the entry of the judgment. In all cases, 
the judgment may be issued and enforced immediately. 
Rule 4-501 Motions. (Utah Code of Judicial Administration) 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, 
supporting memoranda and documents with the court. 
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling 
on dispositive motions. 
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all district and 
circuit courts except proceedings before the court commissioners 
and the small claims department of the circuit court. This rule 
does not apply to petitions for habeas corpus or other forms of 
extraordinary relief. 
Statement of the Rule: 
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(1) Filing and Service of Motions and Memoranda. 
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, except 
uncontested or ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied by a 
memorandum of points and authorities appropriate affidavits, and 
copies of or citations by page number to relevant portions of 
depositions, exhibits, or other documents relied upon in support of 
the motion. Memoranda supporting or opposing a motion shall not 
exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the "statement of material 
facts" as provided in paragraph (2), except as waived by order of 
the court on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte application is 
made to file an over-length memorandum, the application shall state 
the length of the principal memorandum, and if the memorandum is in 
excess of ten pages, the application shall include a summary of the 
memorandum, not to exceed five pages. 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The responding party 
shall file and serve upon all parties within ten days after service 
of a motion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion, and all 
supporting documentation. If the responding party fails to file a 
memorandum in opposition to the motion within ten days after 
service of the motion, the moving party may notify the clerk to 
submit the matter to the court for decision as provided for in 
paragraph 1(d) of this rule. 
(c) Reply Memorandum. The moving party may serve and file a 
reply memorandum within five days after service of the responding 
party's memorandum. 
(d) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration of 
the five day period to file a reply memorandum, either party may 
notify the Clerk to submit the matter to the court for decision. 
The notification shall be in the form of a separate written 
pleading and captioned "Notice to Submit for Decision." The 
notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all parties. 
If neither party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted 
for decision. 
(2) Motions for summary judgment. 
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and 
authorities in support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin 
with a section that contains a concise statement of material facts 
as to which movant contends no genuine issue exists. The facts 
shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall 
specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the 
movant relies. 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and 
authorities in opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall 
begin with a section that contains a concise statement of material 
facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue exists. Each 
disputed fact shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and 
shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which 
the opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall state the 
numbered sentence or sentences in the movant's statement that are 
disputed. All material facts set forth in the movant's statement 
and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall 
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be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless 
specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement. 
(3) Hearings, 
(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a 
hearing unless ordered by the Court, or requested by the parties as 
provided in paragraph (3)(a) or (4) below. 
(b) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of 
the action or any issues in the action on the merits with 
prejudice, either party at the time of filing the principal 
memorandum in support of or in opposition to a motion may file a 
written request for a hearing. 
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that 
(a) the motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) that 
the dispositive issue or set of issues governing the granting or 
denial of the motion has been authoritatively decided. 
(d) When a request for a hearing is denied, the court shall 
notify the requesting party. When a request for a hearing is 
granted, the court shall set the matter for hearing or notify the 
requesting party that the matter shall be heard and the requesting 
party shall schedule the matter for hearing and notify all parties 
of the date and time. 
(e) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy 
copy of the motion, memorandum of points and authorities and all 
documents supporting or opposing the motion shall be delivered to 
the judge hearing the matter at least two working days before the 
date set for hearing. Copies shall be clearly marked as courtesy 
copies and indicate the date and time of the hearing. Courtesy 
copies shall not be filed with the clerk of the court. 
(f) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time 
the parties file their principal memoranda, a hearing on the motion 
shall be deemed waived. 
(g) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty 
(30) days before the scheduled trial date. No dispositive motions 
shall be hears after that date without leave of the Court. 
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for good 
cause shown, the court may grant a request for expedited 
disposition in any case where time is of the essence and compliance 
with the provisions of this rule would be impracticable or where 
the motion does not raise significant legal issues and could be 
resolved summarily. 
(5) Telephone conferences. The court on its own motion or at a 
party's request may direct arguments of any motion by telephone 
conference without court appearances. A verbatim record shall be 
made of all telephone arguments and the rulings thereon if 
requested by counsel. 




To establish a uniform procedure for submitting written 
orders, judgments and decrees to the court. This rule is not 
intended to change existing law with respect to the enforceability 
of unwritten agreements. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all civil proceedings in courts 
except small claims. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or 
parties obtaining the ruling shall within fifteen days, or within 
a shorter time as the court may direct, file with the court a 
proposed order, judgment or decree in conformity with the ruling. 
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments and orders 
shall be served upon opposing counsel before being presented to the 
court for signature unless the court otherwise orders. Notice of 
objections shall be submitted to the court and counsel within five 
days after service. 
(3) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall also be 
reduced to writing and presented to the court for signature within 
fifteen days of the settlement and dismissal. 
(4) Upon entry of judgment, notice of such judgment shall be 
served upon the opposing party and proof of such services shall be 
filed with the court. All judgments, orders and decrees, or copies 
thereof, which are transmitted after signature by the judge, 
including other correspondence requiring a reply, must be 
accompanied by pre-addressed envelopes and pre-paid postage. 
(5) All orders, judgments and decrees shall be prepared in 
such a manner as to show whether they are entered upon the 
stipulation of counsel, the motion of counsel, or upon the court's 
own initiative and shall identify the attorneys of record in the 
cause or proceeding in which the judgment, order or decree is made. 
(6) Except where otherwise ordered, all judgments and decrees 
shall contain the address or last known address of the judgment 
debtor and he social security number of the judgment debtor if 
known. 
(7) All judgments and decrees shall be prepared as separate 
documents and shall not include any matters by reference unless 
otherwise directed by the court. Orders not constituting judgments 
or decrees may be made part of the document containing the 
stipulation or motion upon which the order is based. 
(8) No orders, judgments or decrees based upon stipulation 
shall be signed or entered unless the stipulation is in writing, 
signed by the attorneys of record for the respective parties and 
filed with the clerk or the stipulation was made on the record. 
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(9) In all cases where judgment is rendered upon a written 
obligation to pay money and a judgment has previously been rendered 
upon the same written obligation, the plaintiff or plaintiff's 
counsel shall attach a copy of all previous judgments based upon' 
the same written obligation. 
(10) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit the 
power of any court, upon a proper showing, to enforce a settlement 
agreement or any other agreement which has not been reduced to 
writing. 
Rule 4-506 Withdrawal of counsel in civil cases. (Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration) 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure and criteria for withdrawal 
of counsel in civil cases. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all counsel in civil proceedings in 
trial courts of record except guardians ad litem and court-
appointed counsel. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Consistent with the Rules of Profession Conduct, an 
attorney may withdraw as counsel of record without the approval of 
the court except when (a) a motion has been filed and is pending 
before the court or (b) a certificate of readiness for trial has 
been filed. Under these circumstances, an attorney may not 
withdraw except upon motion and order of the court. 
(2) When an attorney withdraws as counsel of record, written 
notice of the withdrawal must be served upon the client of the 
withdrawing attorney and upon all other parties not in default and 
a certificate of service must be filed with the court. If a trial 
date has been set, the notice of withdrawal served upon the client 
shall include notification of the trial date. 
(3) When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended or 
withdraws from the case or ceases to act as an attorney, opposing 
counsel must notify, in writing, the unrepresented client of 
his/her responsibility to retain another attorney or appear in 
person before opposing counsel can initiate further proceedings 
against the client. A copy of the written notice shall be filed 
with the court and no further proceedings shall be held in the 
matter until 20 days have elapsed from the date of filing. 
Rule 24. Briefs. (Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure). 
(a) Brief of Appellant. The brief of the appellant shall 
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contain under appropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceedings in 
the court or agency whose judgment or order is sought to be 
reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal contains 
the names of all such parties. The list should be set out on a 
separate page which appears immediately inside the cover. 
(2) A table of contents, with page references. 
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically 
arranged and with parallel citations, rules, statutes and other 
authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where 
they are cited. 
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the 
appellate court. 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review and 
the standard of appellate review with supporting authority for each 
issue. 
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, 
rules and regulations whose interpretation is determinative shall 
be set out verbatim with the appropriate citations. If the 
pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will 
suffice, and in that event, the provision shall be set forth as 
provided in paragraph (f) of this rule. 
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first 
indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of 
proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement 
of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall 
follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings 
below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance 
with paragraph (e) of this rule. 
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, 
suitably paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the 
arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall not be 
a mere repetition of the heading under which the argument is 
arranged. 
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the 
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues 
presented, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of 
the record relied on. 
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief 
sought. 
(b) Brief of Appellee. The brief of the appellee shall 
conform to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except 
that a statement of the issues presented need not be made unless 
the appellee is dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant. 
(c) Reply Brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to 
the brief of the appellee, and if the appellee has cross appealed, 
the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the 
appellant on the issues presented on cross-appeal. Reply briefs 
shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in the 
opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to 
the requirements of paragraphs (a) (2) , (3) , (6) , (9) and (1) of 
this rule. No further briefs may be filed except with leave of the 
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court. 
(d) References in briefs to the parties. Counsel will be 
expected in their briefs and oral arguments to keep to a minimum 
references to the parties by such designations as "appellant" and 
"appellee." It promotes clarity to use the designations used in 
the lower courts or in the agency proceedings, or the actual names 
of the parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the 
injured person," "the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be 
made to the pages of the original record as paginated pursuant to 
Rule 11(b), to pages of the reporter's transcript, or to pages of 
any statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement 
prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to exhibits 
shall include exhibit numbers. If reference is made to evidence 
the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be 
made to the pages of the transcript at which the evidence was 
identified, offered and received or rejected. 
(f) Reproductions of statutes, rules, regulations, documents, 
etc. If determination of the issues presented requires the study 
of statutes, rules, regulations, etc., or relevant parts thereof, 
to the extent not set forth under subparagraph (a) (6) of this rule, 
they shall be reproduced in the brief, or in an addendum at the 
end, or they may be supplied to the court in pamphlet form. Copies 
of those parts of the record on appeal that are of central 
importance to the determination of the appeal (e.g. the challenged 
instructions, findings of fact and conclusions of law, memorandum 
decision, the contract or document subject to construction,etc.) 
shall be included in the addendum. 
(g) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, 
principal briefs shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall 
not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the table of 
contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing statutes, 
rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by 
paragraph (f) of this rule. 
(h) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-
appeal is filed, the party first filing a notice of appeal shall be 
deemed the appellant for the purposes of this rule, and Rule 26, 
unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise orders. 
The brief of the appellee shall contain the issues and arguments 
involved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of 
the appellant. 
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or 
appellees. In cases involving more than one appellant or appellee, 
including cases consolidated for purposes of appeal, any number of 
either may join in a single brief, and any appellant or appellee 
may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another. Parties 
may similarly join in reply briefs. 
(j) Citations of supplemental authorities. When pertinent 
and significant authorities come to the attention of a party after 
that party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but 
before decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the 
appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An 
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original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme 
Court. An original letter and seven copies shall be filed in the 
Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference either to the page of 
the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations 
pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons 
for the supplemental citations. Any responses shall be made within 
7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited. 
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule 
must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with 
proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or 
scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be 
disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and 
the court may assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer. 
(1) Brief covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of heavy 
cover stock and shall comply with Rule 27. 
9 
ARGUMENT 
A. Crandall's Brief Complies with Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure because it concisely lays out the issues 
for review, the standards applicable to each issue and the 
relief sought on appeal. 
Crandall's brief clearly complies with Rule 24 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Crandall's brief concisely 
presents the issues for review on appeal. (Appellant's Brief 
pages 1, 2). Crandall's brief correctly states the standard of 
review this court should apply with respect to each issue. 
(Appellant's Brief pages 1,2). Finally, Crandall's brief 
clearly states the relief sought from this court. (Appellant's 
Brief pages 8, 9, 13, 15, 18, 20, 21, and 22). Thus, this Court 
must consider Crandall's Brief in rendering its decision on these 
matters. 
Crandall's brief contains concise statements of the issues 
for review. Rule 24(a)(5) and (9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure state 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review and the 
standard of appellate review with supporting authority for 
each issue. 
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions 
and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues 
presented, with citations to the authorities, statutes and 
parts of the record relied on. 
Rule 24(a)(5) and (9), Ut. R. App. P. (1993). Crandall's brief 
clearly meets the requirements of both Rule 24(a)(5) and (9) of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Crandall's brief contains a brief statement of the issues 
presented and the standards for appellate review. (See 
Appellant's brief pages 1, 2). Additionally, the brief contains 
1 
an argument section which contains both the contentions and 
reasons of the appellant combined with citations to the relevant 
authority in support thereof. (See Appellant's Brief pages 10-
22) . 
Crandall's brief does not possess the characteristics which 
warrant dismissing the brief on either Woodcock's motion or sua 
sponte pursuant Rule 24(k) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. Rule 24(k) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
states 
All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with 
accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free 
from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous 
matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be 
disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the 
court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the 
offending lawyer. 
Rule 24(k), Ut. R. App. P. (1993). In State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 
599, 602 (Utah App. 1992), this Court stated that a brief was 
insufficient where the issues listed "do not correlate with the 
substance of the brief." In the present case, it is clear that 
issues presented in Crandall's brief directly "correlate with the 
substance of the brief." Therefore, the issues presented satisfy 
this Court's criteria for meeting the requirements of Rule 24. 
Additionally, in Yates, the court stated that the argument 
section of the brief was insufficient because the "brief contains 
no authority and contains no meaningful analysis as to this 
argument." Yates at 602. Crandall's brief contains both 
authority and meaningful analysis in support of his contentions. 
Thus, Crandall's brief satisfies the requirements of Rule 24 of 
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the Appellate Rules of Procedure and therefore this Court must 
consider Crandall's brief in determining the issues presented and 
briefed therein. 
B. Woodcock's submission of the judgment to the court for 
signing prior to presenting the judgment to Crandall 
violated Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. 
Woodcock violated Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration when it submitted the judgment to the court for 
signing without first presenting the judgment to Crandall. Rule 
4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration in the relevant 
portion states 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting written 
orders, judgments and decrees to the court. This rule is 
not intended to change existing law with respect to the 
enforceability of unwritten agreements. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall be applicable to all civil proceedings in 
courts of record except small claims. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or 
parties obtaining the ruling shall within fifteen days, or 
within a shorter time as the court may direct, file with the 
court a proposed order, judgment or decree in conformity 
with the ruling. 
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgment and orders 
shall be served upon opposing counsel before being presented 
to the court for signature unless the court otherwise 
orders. Notice of objections shall be submitted to the 
court and counsel within five days after service. 
Rule 4-504, Ut. C.J.A. (1993)(emphasis added). 
Woodcock violated Rule 4-504 because he did not first submit 
the judgment to Crandall as required by the rule. While 
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Woodcock's assertion that the rule contains an exception under 
which a judge may order the immediate issuance of the judgment, 
Woodcock is incorrect in his assertion that the judge did so in 
this case. In the present case, Woodcock's Motion for Summary 
Judgment was heard at a Hearing scheduled for November 23, 1992. 
(R. 000259). At that hearing, the judge granted Woodcock's Motion 
for Summary Judgment as reflected in the clerk's minute entry. 
(R. 000264). In that minute entry, the court states that "Mr. 
Anderson to prepare order." (R. 000264). However, there is 
nothing in the terms of the minute entry which states that the 
judgment was to be effective immediately upon the ruling of the 
court and that the requirements of Rule 4-504 had been suspended. 
It is Crandall's position that Woodcock's attorney prepared 
the judgment pursuant to the minute entry but included wording, 
amounts, and orders which Crandall suggests went beyond the 
ruling of the Court and to which he would have objected if given 
the opportunity afforded by the rules. The judgment is largely 
in conformity with the relief sought in Woodcock's Motion for 
Summary Judgment but goes beyond what Crandall believes was ruled 
by the Court from the bench and is clearly more than is set forth 
in the Minute Entry. Nonetheless, Woodcock submitted the 
judgment to the judge for his signature without first submitting 
the judgment to Crandall. This is in direct violation of Rule 4-
504 which mandates that copies of the proposed judgment "be 
served upon opposing counsel before being submitted to the court 
for signature." Rule 4-504, Ut C.J.A. (1993)(emphasis added). 
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Woodcock argues that his apparent violation of Rule 4-504 is 
excused by the provisions of §78-36-10(4), U.C.A. (1993). 
Appellant disagrees. This section, in relevant part, states 
If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after default 
in the payment of rent, execution upon the judgment shall be 
issued immediately after the entry of the judgment. In all 
cases, the judgment may be issued and enforced immediately. 
§78-36-10(4), U.C.A. (1993)(emphasis added). This section 
provides for the court to exercise its discretion in issuing an 
immediate judgment. In this case, the court did not so exercise 
its discretion. Rather, Woodcock, in preparing the order and 
judgment, exercised his discretion in presenting what he wanted 
included in the order without serving the judgment on Crandall. 
Section 78-36-10(4) gives the court power to act quickly but this 
language is not a blanket excuse for not complying with the 
provisions of Rule 4-504 absent clear direction to do so by the 
court. Because the court did nothing more than issue a minute 
entry requiring Woodcock to prepare an order for the court's 
signature, and did not otherwise direct, Woodcock was required by 
the mandatory provisions of Rule 4-504 to first serve the 
proposed judgment on Crandall. Having not done so, Woodcock 
violated Rule 4-504 and the judgment should be vacated. 
C. Woodcock violated Rule 4-506 by failing to wait twenty days 
after serving a Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel before 
initiating additional proceedings against Crandall. 
Rule 4-506 is clearly a rule of equity designed to protect 
the unrepresented party from the potentially harsh consequences 
which might arise by attorneys whose skill outmatches a lay 
individual that is temporarily unrepresented. The obvious 
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purpose of the rule is to permit the unrepresented party a 
reasonable "time-out" period to obtain new counsel during which 
period of time no action in the case is permitted. When Woodcock 
filed his expansive Motion for Summary Judgment without waiting 
the twenty days required by the rule, he violated not only the 
letter of the rules, but the spirit and intent as well. He 
forced Crandall, prematurely, and at great disadvantage, into a 
futile and ill-fated effort to find counsel who could drop 
everything and respond on extremely short notice to what was 
clearly a massive effort to summarily dispose of a very contested 
and complex matter. Clearly, that is the very disadvantage the 
rules seeks to protect against. 
Woodcock erroneously argues that the statute should be read 
to permit a party to initiate proceedings at anytime following 
the service of the notice required by Rule 4-506. This argument, 
if adopted, would undermine the very purpose of the rule. The 
rule is designed to protect the unrepresented party. An 
unrepresented party who has submitted themselves to the 
jurisdiction of the court becomes a pro se litigant only after 
the expiration of the "time-out" period if other counsel is not 
retained. To serve the motion when no counsel is present forces 
Crandall to be a pro se litigant earlier than the rule allows. 
Crandall was forced to be a pro se litigant in this case at the 
time the Motion for Summary Judgment was filed. In Nelson v. 
Jacobsen, the Utah Supreme Court addressed the latitude that 
should be extended to pro se litigants, 
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As a general rule, a party who represents himself will be 
held to the same standard of knowledge and practice as any 
qualified member of the bar. [citations omitted]. At the 
same time, we have also cautioned that "because of his lack 
of technical knowledge of law and procedure [a layman acting 
as his own attorney] should be accorded every consideration 
that may reasonably be indulged. 
Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983) citing to 
Heathman v. Hatch, 13 Utah 2d at 268, 373 P.2d at 991. 
Neither Woodcock nor the trial court accorded Crandall every 
consideration that may reasonably be indulged. Crandall's 
counsel filed a notice of withdrawal on October 26, 1992. (R. 
000089-000090). Woodcock filed a Notice to Obtain Counsel or 
Appear in Person on October 27, 1992. (R. 000091-000092). 
Fourteen days later, on November 10, 1992, Woodcock filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 000135-000138). A reasonable 
interpretation which effectuates the purposes of Rule 4-506 
required Woodcock to wait until at least November 16, 1992 before 
filing his Motion for Summary Judgment. Thus, Woodcock did not 
accord Crandall the reasonable consideration his status as a pro 
se litigant would require if the court follows Nelson v. 
Jacobsen. 
The trial court did not accord Crandall every consideration 
either. On the day of the hearing, Crandall requested a 
continuation to find new counsel who could effectively respond to 
the Motion for Summary Judgment. The trial court denied the 
request for a continuation. In light of the fact that the Motion 
for Summary Judgment is the equivalent of a proceeding which was 
filed less than twenty days after filing a Notice to Obtain 
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Counsel or Appear in Person, this can hardly be considered 
indulging Crandall, as a pro se litigant, every reasonable 
consideration. 
Woodcock's counsel's actions violated not only the express 
wording of Rule 4-506, but the underlying spirit and purpose as 
well. By failing to abide by this rule, neither Woodcock nor the 
trial court accorded Crandall every reasonable consideration 
which should be accorded a pro se litigant. Therefore, since the 
standard set by this court was not followed, this court should 
vacate the judgment below. 
D. The trial court erred in granting Summary Judgment because 
there are genuine issues of material fact which preclude the 
granting of Summary Judgment. 
The trial court erred in granting Summary Judgment because 
there are genuine issues of material fact which make granting 
summary judgment improper in this case. Crandall presented ample 
and sufficient evidence of contested material fact to preclude 
summary judgment. Therefore, this court should reverse the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment. 
Crandall created a genuine issue of material fact through 
his affidavit filed in opposition of Woodcock's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Specifically, Crandall refutes the alleged 
existence of an oral lease agreement between the parties and 
denies the existence of a tenancy. (R. 000262) . Crandall 
specifically denies that the parties agreement in any way 
contemplated the payment of taxes in the periodic payments. (R. 
000262). Crandall's affidavit restates his consistently 
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maintained position found in all the depositions that he and 
Woodcock were joint venturers in the building and not landlord 
and tenant. When Crandall's affidavit raised these genuine 
issues of material fact the trial court should not have granted 
summary judgment in this case. 
Woodcock's assertions concerning the statute of frauds and 
part performance should not be considered on appeal. First, 
Woodcock failed to raise these issues below and therefore this 
court should not consider them for the first time now on appeal. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, there are genuine issues of 
material fact with respect to whether Crandall partially 
performed the verbal joint venture agreement thus taking the 
contract out of the statute of frauds. These questions arise in 
the context of the scope and content of the original agreement 
with respect to both the purchase and Crandall's possession of 
the property which have been discussed above. Because questions 
of the statute of frauds and part performance have not been 
considered below, this court should not address them now for the 
first time on appeal either as new issues or as make weight 
arguments to support what the trial court did below. Moreover, 
the question of whether Crandall has partially performed or not, 
which would act to take the verbal contract out of the purview of 
the statute of frauds, requires a complete and thorough 
understanding of both the agreement to purchase and the facts 
surrounding Defendant's possession of the property, and all of 
these facts are unarguably in dispute. With these fact issues 
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properly (if not artfully) framed before the court, summary 
judgment is inappropriate. This court should reverse the trial 
courts grant of summary judgment and remand the case for trial. 
Crandall's failure to submit an opposing memoranda should 
not result in Woodcock's statement of facts being deemed as true 
under Rule 4-501(2)(b). Rule 4-501(2)(b) in the relevant part 
states 
All material facts set forth in the movants statement and 
properly supported by an accurate reference to the record 
shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment 
unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's 
statements. 
Rule 4-501(2) (b), Ut. C.J.A. (1993). Crandall specifically 
denied many of Woodcock's statement of facts in his affidavit and 
therefore Woodcock's assertion that his Statement of Facts should 
be deemed admitted is erroneous. Woodcock further erroneously 
asserts that Crandall's failure to submit a memorandum in 
opposition to Woodcock's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
sufficient to deem Woodcock's statement of facts as true. Rule 
4-501 does not require a party to file an opposing memorandum. 
The rule only requires that the opposing party specifically 
controvert the statement of facts. Crandall's affidavit is 
sufficient to meet the requirements of Rule 4-501. Thus, because 
Woodcock's statement of facts cannot be deemed true and because 
Crandall's affidavit creates genuine issues of material fact, the 
trial court erred in granting Woodcock's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
Woodcock wishes to deny Crandall's right to use depositions 
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in support of his appellate brief while at the same time using 
the depositions in support of his motion for summary judgment. 
In his brief, Woodcock asserts that under the rule of law 
presented in Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow Irr, Co., 813 P.2d 1169 
(Utah 1991), that the court may not consider on appeal deposition 
which are not before the court below. While this is an accurate 
statement of the law, it is one which should apply to both 
parties. Woodcock wishes to preclude Crandall's use of 
depositions which were not before the court below while at the 
same time utilizing the deposition for its own purposes. The 
record below is devoid of any reference to a motion to publish 
the depositions. In fact, the depositions were never published 
or in any way properly brought before the court below. 
Nonetheless, Woodcock relied heavily on the depositions in 
support of his Motion for Summary Judgment and now on appeal. 
Woodcock should not be permitted to have it both ways. Either 
both parties should be permitted to use the depositions or both 
parties should be precluded from using the depositions. This 
court should disregard Woodcock's argument that Crandall may not 
use the depositions because Woodcock himself is using depositions 
which were not properly before the court below. Moreover, the 
depositions when viewed in full context, as opposed to the 
excerpts selected by Woodcock's counsel, clearly demonstrate the 
existence of the material facts in dispute. 
Crandall has raised genuine issues of material fact. 
Crandall's affidavit is a part of the record and raises genuine 
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issues of material fact as to the oral agreement between the 
parties both as to the joint venture and the right of possession. 
Thus, the trial court erred in granting Summary Judgment as a 
matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Crandall's brief is concise. It clearly states the issues 
for review and the standards. Woodcock violated Rules 4-504 and 
Rule 4-506 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Woodcock 
violated Rule 4-504 by failing to first submit the judgment to 
Crandall before submitting the judgment to the trial court for 
its signature. Woodcock violated Rule 4-506 by filing his Motion 
for Summary Judgment without waiting twenty days after serving 
Crandall with a Notice to Obtain Counsel or Appear in Person. 
Moreover, Woodcock violated the common sense notions of fairness 
by attempting to gain an advantage over Crandall who was reduced 
to the status of a pro se litigant at the time Woodcock filed his 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Finally, the trial court erred as a 
matter of law in granting Woodcock's Motion for Summary Judgment 
because there are genuine issues of material fact which preclude 
granting summary judgment. Because of all of the errors 
mentioned above, this court should vacate the trial court's 
judgment and remand the case to be tried on the merits. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /^ day of August, 1993. 
StevenCU Tycksen 
Steven C. Tycksen 
Attorney for Appellant 
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